Wall Street Journal: BP Installs Sealing Cap on Errant Well

Let’s hope this is the beginning of the end of the blowout. DV

July 12, 2010

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704288204575362821280847274.html?mod=djemalertNEWS

By SUSAN DAKER And CASSANDRA SWEET

HOUSTONBP PLC said Monday night it had installed a new sealing cap that could halt the oil spewing from its broken well in the Gulf of Mexico, raising the possibility that a nearly three-month long environmental crisis could soon be contained.

It could be another 48 hours before the company knows if the cap has entirely sealed the well. During that period, the company will perform a series of pressure tests to check the well’s integrity. Concerns have been raised that the well could be even more damaged than previously known and that another uncontrolled leak could occur at any time.

The sealing-cap system hasn’t been used before at these depths or conditions, BP said, adding that the system’s “ability to contain the oil and gas cannot be assured.”

But if all goes according to plan, BP’s latest effort could finally bring the runaway well under control and make headway toward ending a saga that has cost the company billions of dollars and put it at odds with much of the American public and U.S. government.

.”We have to recognize that this is a complex operation,” said Doug Suttles, the company’s chief operating office, during a teleconference early Monday. “Our confidence is growing.”

The success of the U.K. oil company’s latest effort hinges on a variety of complex procedures. Some other efforts the company had been optimistic about in the past failed or were abandoned as too difficult in water so deep robots are required to do the labor.

BP has been working to contain the mile-deep leak since shortly after Transocean Ltd.’s Deepwater Horizon drilling rig exploded on April 20, killing 11 people.

“There are challenges with each of these steps. We have to understand that some of these operations could take longer than forecasted,” Mr. Suttles said.

As BP tests the new cap, a high pressure reading would be good news, indicating that the well is in fine shape and the new cap is confining all the oil.

Even if the cap doesn’t capture all the oil, installing it was a necessary step to prepare for an expected busy hurricane season. The new cap can allow containment vessels to more quickly disconnect from the system and flee a storm.

In the absence of bad weather, the cap will also allow more ships to connect to the well and therefore increase the amount of oil BP collects.

Mr. Suttles stressed that no matter how things work out with the cap, the company was still placing its faith in the ability of a relief well to permanently kill the overflowing well. The relief well could be finished by the end of the month, he said.

Also Monday, BP said in a Securities and Exchange Commission filing that the cost of its response to the crisis has risen to roughly $3.5 billion so far.

The company launched a new containment vessel Monday, the Helix Producer, and expected to have oil from the well reaching it by Monday evening. The ship has been near the well for about two weeks but was delayed from taking part in the operation by bad weather and technical problems.

With the Helix Producer still not up to full speed, only one ship was siphoning oil from the well, the Q4000, which flared off more than 4,000 barrels of oil during the last 12 hours of Sunday, the company said.

The rest of the oil is flowing into the Gulf, where about 50 skimmer ships were working to catch it when it reached the surface, Mr. Suttles said. Some oil was also being burned away on the surface of the water, he said.

Federal and independent scientists have estimated that between 35,000 and 60,000 barrels of oil have flowed into the Gulf from the broken well each day since the crisis began. The oil has fouled the shores of at least four coastal states and has damped tourism and seafood industries in the area.

For the past several weeks, the more loosely fitting cap and the Q4000 system have managed to keep as much as about 25,000 barrels a day out of the Gulf. The new sealing-cap system, plus additional measures, will allow the recovery of 60,000 barrels to 80,000 barrels a day in two to three weeks, BP has said.

Write to Susan Daker at susan.daker@dowjones.com
and Cassandra Sweet at cassandra.sweet@dowjones.com

Special thanks to Richard Charter

The Guardian: Gulf oil spill: A hole in the world

http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2010/jun/19/naomi-klein-gulf-oil-spill

The Deepwater Horizon disaster is not just an industrial accident – it is a violent wound inflicted on the Earth itself. In this special report from the Gulf coast, a leading author and activist shows how it lays bare the hubris at the heart of capitalism
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‘Obama cannot order pelicans not to die (no matter whose ass he kicks). And no amount of money – not BP’s $20bn, not $100bn – can replace a culture that’s lost its roots.’ Photograph: Lee Celano/Reuters

Everyone gathered for the town hall meeting had been repeatedly instructed to show civility to the gentlemen from BP and the federal government. These fine folks had made time in their busy schedules to come to a high school gymnasium on a Tuesday night in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, one of many coastal communities where brown poison was slithering through the marshes, part of what has come to be described as the largest environmental disaster in US history.

“Speak to others the way you would want to be spoken to,” the chair of the meeting pleaded one last time before opening the floor for questions.

And for a while the crowd, mostly made up of fishing families, showed remarkable restraint. They listened patiently to Larry Thomas, a genial BP public relations flack, as he told them that he was committed to “doing better” to process their claims for lost revenue – then passed all the details off to a markedly less friendly subcontractor. They heard out the suit from the Environmental Protection Agency as he informed them that, contrary to what they have read about the lack of testing and the product being banned in Britain, the chemical dispersant being sprayed on the oil in massive quantities was really perfectly safe.
But patience started running out by the third time Ed Stanton, a coast guard captain, took to the podium to reassure them that “the coast guard intends to make sure that BP cleans it up”.

“Put it in writing!” someone shouted out. By now the air conditioning had shut itself off and the coolers of Budweiser were running low. A shrimper named Matt O’Brien approached the mic. “We don’t need to hear this anymore,” he declared, hands on hips. It didn’t matter what assurances they were offered because, he explained, “we just don’t trust you guys!” And with that, such a loud cheer rose up from the floor you’d have thought the Oilers (the unfortunately named school football team) had scored a touchdown.

The showdown was cathartic, if nothing else. For weeks residents had been subjected to a barrage of pep talks and extravagant promises coming from Washington, Houston and London. Every time they turned on their TVs, there was the BP boss, Tony Hayward, offering his solemn word that he would “make it right”. Or else it was President Barack Obama expressing his absolute confidence that his administration would “leave the Gulf coast in better shape than it was before”, that he was “making sure” it “comes back even stronger than it was before this crisis”.

It all sounded great. But for people whose livelihoods put them in intimate contact with the delicate chemistry of the wetlands, it also sounded completely ridiculous, painfully so. Once the oil coats the base of the marsh grass, as it had already done just a few miles from here, no miracle machine or chemical concoction could safely get it out. You can skim oil off the surface of open water, and you can rake it off a sandy beach, but an oiled marsh just sits there, slowly dying. The larvae of countless species for which the marsh is a spawning ground – shrimp, crab, oysters and fin fish – will be poisoned.

It was already happening. Earlier that day, I travelled through nearby marshes in a shallow water boat. Fish were jumping in waters encircled by white boom, the strips of thick cotton and mesh BP is using to soak up the oil. The circle of fouled material seemed to be tightening around the fish like a noose. Nearby, a red-winged blackbird perched atop a 2 metre (7ft) blade of oil-contaminated marsh grass. Death was creeping up the cane; the small bird may as well have been standing on a lit stick of dynamite.

And then there is the grass itself, or the Roseau cane, as the tall sharp blades are called. If oil seeps deeply enough into the marsh, it will not only kill the grass above ground but also the roots. Those roots are what hold the marsh together, keeping bright green land from collapsing into the Mississippi River delta and the Gulf of Mexico. So not only do places like Plaquemines Parish stand to lose their fisheries, but also much of the physical barrier that lessens the intensity of fierce storms like hurricane Katrina. Which could mean losing everything.

How long will it take for an ecosystem this ravaged to be “restored and made whole” as Obama’s interior secretary has pledged to do? It’s not at all clear that such a thing is remotely possible, at least not in a time frame we can easily wrap our heads around. The Alaskan fisheries have yet to fully recover from the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill and some species of fish never returned. Government scientists now estimate that as much as a Valdez-worth of oil may be entering the Gulf coastal waters every four days. An even worse prognosis emerges from the 1991 Gulf war spill, when an estimated 11m barrels of oil were dumped into the Persian Gulf – the largest spill ever. That oil entered the marshland and stayed there, burrowing deeper and deeper thanks to holes dug by crabs.

It’s not a perfect comparison, since so little clean-up was done, but according to a study conducted 12 years after the disaster, nearly 90% of the impacted muddy salt marshes and mangroves were still profoundly damaged.

We do know this. Far from being “made whole,” the Gulf coast, more than likely, will be diminished. Its rich waters and crowded skies will be less alive than they are today. The physical space many communities occupy on the map will also shrink, thanks to erosion. And the coast’s legendary culture will contract and wither. The fishing families up and down the coast do not just gather food, after all. They hold up an intricate network that includes family tradition, cuisine, music, art and endangered languages – much like the roots of grass holding up the land in the marsh. Without fishing, these unique cultures lose their root system, the very ground on which they stand. (BP, for its part, is well aware of the limits of recovery. The company’s Gulf of Mexico regional oil spill response plan specifically instructs officials not to make “promises that property, ecology, or anything else will be restored to normal”. Which is no doubt why its officials consistently favour folksy terms like “make it right”.)

If Katrina pulled back the curtain on the reality of racism in America, the BP disaster pulls back the curtain on something far more hidden: how little control even the most ingenious among us have over the awesome, intricately interconnected natural forces with which we so casually meddle. BP cannot plug the hole in the Earth that it made. Obama cannot order fish species to survive, or brown pelicans not to go extinct (no matter whose ass he kicks).

No amount of money – not BP’s recently pledged $20bn (£13.5bn), not $100bn – can replace a culture that has lost its roots. And while our politicians and corporate leaders have yet to come to terms with these humbling truths, the people whose air, water and livelihoods have been contaminated are losing their illusions fast.

“Everything is dying,” a woman said as the town hall meeting was finally coming to a close. “How can you honestly tell us that our Gulf is resilient and will bounce back? Because not one of you up here has a hint as to what is going to happen to our Gulf. You sit up here with a straight face and act like you know when you don’t know.”

This Gulf coast crisis is about many things – corruption, deregulation, the addiction to fossil fuels. But underneath it all, it’s about this: our culture’s excruciatingly dangerous claim to have such complete understanding and command over nature that we can radically manipulate and re-engineer it with minimal risk to the natural systems that sustain us. But as the BP disaster has revealed, nature is always more unpredictable than the most sophisticated mathematical and geological models imagine. During Thursday’s congressional testimony, Hayward said: “The best minds and the deepest expertise are being brought to bear” on the crisis, and that, “with the possible exception of the space programme in the 1960s, it is difficult to imagine the gathering of a larger, more technically proficient team in one place in peacetime.” And yet, in the face of what the geologist Jill Schneiderman has described as “Pandora’s well”, they are like the men at the front of that gymnasium: they act like they know, but they don’t know.

BP’s mission statement

In the arc of human history, the notion that nature is a machine for us to re-engineer at will is a relatively recent conceit. In her ground-breaking 1980 book The Death of Nature, the environmental historian Carolyn Merchant reminded readers that up until the 1600s, the Earth was alive, usually taking the form of a mother. Europeans – like indigenous people the world over – believed the planet to be a living organism, full of life-giving powers but also wrathful tempers. There were, for this reason, strong taboos against actions that would deform and desecrate “the mother”, including mining.

The metaphor changed with the unlocking of some (but by no means all) of nature’s mysteries during the scientific revolution of the 1600s. With nature now cast as a machine, devoid of mystery or divinity, its component parts could be dammed, extracted and remade with impunity. Nature still sometimes appeared as a woman, but one easily dominated and subdued. Sir Francis Bacon best encapsulated the new ethos when he wrote in the 1623 De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum that nature is to be “put in constraint, moulded, and made as it were new by art and the hand of man”.

Those words may as well have been BP’s corporate mission statement. Boldly inhabiting what the company called “the energy frontier”, it dabbled in synthesising methane-producing microbes and announced that “a new area of investigation” would be geoengineering. And of course it bragged that, at its Tiber prospect in the Gulf of Mexico, it now had “the deepest well ever drilled by the oil and gas industry” – as deep under the ocean floor as jets fly overhead.

Imagining and preparing for what would happen if these experiments in altering the building blocks of life and geology went wrong occupied precious little space in the corporate imagination. As we have all discovered, after the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded on 20 April, the company had no systems in place to effectively respond to this scenario. Explaining why it did not have even the ultimately unsuccessful containment dome waiting to be activated on shore, a BP spokesman, Steve Rinehart, said: “I don’t think anybody foresaw the circumstance that we’re faced with now.” Apparently, it “seemed inconceivable” that the blowout preventer would ever fail – so why prepare?

This refusal to contemplate failure clearly came straight from the top. A year ago, Hayward told a group of graduate students at Stanford University that he has a plaque on his desk that reads: “If you knew you could not fail, what would you try?” Far from being a benign inspirational slogan, this was actually an accurate description of how BP and its competitors behaved in the real world. In recent hearings on Capitol Hill, congressman Ed Markey of Massachusetts grilled representatives from the top oil and gas companies on the revealing ways in which they had allocated resources. Over three years, they had spent “$39bn to explore for new oil and gas. Yet, the average investment in research and development for safety, accident prevention and spill response was a paltry $20m a year.”

These priorities go a long way towards explaining why the initial exploration plan that BP submitted to the federal government for the ill-fated Deepwater Horizon well reads like a Greek tragedy about human hubris. The phrase “little risk” appears five times. Even if there is a spill, BP confidently predicts that, thanks to “proven equipment and technology”, adverse affects will be minimal. Presenting nature as a predictable and agreeable junior partner (or perhaps subcontractor), the report cheerfully explains that should a spill occur, “Currents and microbial degradation would remove the oil from the water column or dilute the constituents to background levels”. The effects on fish, meanwhile, “would likely be sublethal” because of “the capability of adult fish and shellfish to avoid a spill [and] to metabolise hydrocarbons”. (In BP’s telling, rather than a dire threat, a spill emerges as an all-you-can-eat buffet for aquatic life.)

Best of all, should a major spill occur, there is, apparently, “little risk of contact or impact to the coastline” because of the company’s projected speedy response (!) and “due to the distance [of the rig] to shore” – about 48 miles (77km). This is the most astonishing claim of all. In a gulf that often sees winds of more than 70km an hour, not to mention hurricanes, BP had so little respect for the ocean’s capacity to ebb and flow, surge and heave, that it did not think oil could make a paltry 77km trip. (Last week, a shard of the exploded Deepwater Horizon showed up on a beach in Florida, 306km away.)

None of this sloppiness would have been possible, however, had BP not been making its predictions to a political class eager to believe that nature had indeed been mastered. Some, like Republican Lisa Murkowski, were more eager than others. The Alaskan senator was so awe-struck by the industry’s four-dimensional seismic imaging that she proclaimed deep-sea drilling to have reached the very height of controlled artificiality. “It’s better than Disneyland in terms of how you can take technologies and go after a resource that is thousands of years old and do so in an environmentally sound way,” she told the Senate energy committee just seven months ago.

Drilling without thinking has of course been Republican party policy since May 2008. With gas prices soaring to unprecedented heights, that’s when the conservative leader Newt Gingrich unveiled the slogan “Drill Here, Drill Now, Pay Less” – with an emphasis on the now. The wildly popular campaign was a cry against caution, against study, against measured action. In Gingrich’s telling, drilling at home wherever the oil and gas might be – locked in Rocky Mountain shale, in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, and deep offshore – was a surefire way to lower the price at the pump, create jobs, and kick Arab ass all at once. In the face of this triple win, caring about the environment was for sissies: as senator Mitch McConnell put it, “in Alabama and Mississippi and Louisiana and Texas, they think oil rigs are pretty”. By the time the infamous “Drill Baby Drill” Republican national convention rolled around, the party base was in such a frenzy for US-made fossil fuels, they would have bored under the convention floor if someone had brought a big enough drill.

Obama, eventually, gave in, as he invariably does. With cosmic bad timing, just three weeks before the Deepwater Horizon blew up, the president announced he would open up previously protected parts of the country to offshore drilling. The practice was not as risky as he had thought, he explained. “Oil rigs today generally don’t cause spills. They are technologically very advanced.” That wasn’t enough for Sarah Palin, however, who sneered at the Obama administration’s plans to conduct more studies before drilling in some areas. “My goodness, folks, these areas have been studied to death,” she told the Southern Republican leadership conference in New Orleans, now just 11 days before the blowout. “Let’s drill, baby, drill, not stall, baby, stall!” And there was much rejoicing.

In his congressional testimony, Hayward said: “We and the entire industry will learn from this terrible event.” And one might well imagine that a catastrophe of this magnitude would indeed instil BP executives and the “Drill Now” crowd with a new sense of humility. There are, however, no signs that this is the case. The response to the disaster – at the corporate and governmental levels – has been rife with the precise brand of arrogance and overly sunny predictions that created the disaster in the first place.

The ocean is big, she can take it, we heard from Hayward in the early days. While spokesman John Curry insisted that hungry microbes would consume whatever oil was in the water system, because “nature has a way of helping the situation”. But nature has not been playing along. The deep-sea gusher has bust out of all BP’s top hats, containment domes, and junk shots. The ocean’s winds and currents have made a mockery of the lightweight booms BP has laid out to absorb the oil. “We told them,” said Byron Encalade, the president of the Louisiana Oysters Association. “The oil’s gonna go over the booms or underneath the bottom.” Indeed it did. The marine biologist Rick Steiner, who has been following the clean up closely, estimates that “70% or 80% of the booms are doing absolutely nothing at all”.

And then there are the controversial chemical dispersants: more than 1.3m gallons dumped with the company’s trademark “what could go wrong?” attitude. As the angry residents at the Plaquemines Parish town hall rightly point out, few tests had been conducted, and there is scant research about what this unprecedented amount of dispersed oil will do to marine life. Nor is there a way to clean up the toxic mixture of oil and chemicals below the surface. Yes, fast multiplying microbes do devour underwater oil – but in the process they also absorb the water’s oxygen, creating a whole new threat to marine life.

BP had even dared to imagine that it could prevent unflattering images of oil-covered beaches and birds from escaping the disaster zone. When I was on the water with a TV crew, for instance, we were approached by another boat whose captain asked, “”Y’all work for BP?” When we said no, the response – in the open ocean – was “You can’t be here then”. But of course these heavy-handed tactics, like all the others, have failed. There is simply too much oil in too many places. “You cannot tell God’s air where to flow and go, and you can’t tell water where to flow and go,” I was told by Debra Ramirez. It was a lesson she had learned from living in Mossville, Louisiana, surrounded by 14 emission-spewing petrochemical plants, and watching illness spread from neighbour to neighbour.

Human limitation has been the one constant of this catastrophe. After two months, we still have no idea how much oil is flowing, nor when it will stop. The company’s claim that it will complete relief wells by the end of August – repeated by Obama in his Oval Office address – is seen by many scientists as a bluff. The procedure is risky and could fail, and there is a real possibility that the oil could continue to leak for years.

The flow of denial shows no sign of abating either. Louisiana politicians indignantly oppose Obama’s temporary freeze on deepwater drilling, accusing him of killing the one big industry left standing now that fishing and tourism are in crisis. Palin mused on Facebook that “no human endeavour is ever without risk”, while Texas Republican congressman John Culberson described the disaster as a “statistical anomaly”. By far the most sociopathic reaction, however, comes from veteran Washington commentator Llewellyn King: rather than turning away from big engineering risks, we should pause in “wonder that we can build machines so remarkable that they can lift the lid off the underworld”.

Make the bleeding stop

Thankfully, many are taking a very different lesson from the disaster, standing not in wonder at humanity’s power to reshape nature, but at our powerlessness to cope with the fierce natural forces we unleash. There is something else too. It is the feeling that the hole at the bottom of the ocean is more than an engineering accident or a broken machine. It is a violent wound in a living organism; that it is part of us. And thanks to BP’s live camera feed, we can all watch the Earth’s guts gush forth, in real time, 24 hours a day.

John Wathen, a conservationist with the Waterkeeper Alliance, was one of the few independent observers to fly over the spill in the early days of the disaster. After filming the thick red streaks of oil that the coast guard politely refers to as “rainbow sheen”, he observed what many had felt: “The Gulf seems to be bleeding.” This imagery comes up again and again in conversations and interviews. Monique Harden, an environmental rights lawyer in New Orleans, refuses to call the disaster an “oil spill” and instead says, “we are haemorrhaging”. Others speak of the need to “make the bleeding stop”. And I was personally struck, flying over the stretch of ocean where the Deepwater Horizon sank with the US Coast Guard, that the swirling shapes the oil made in the ocean waves looked remarkably like cave drawings: a feathery lung gasping for air, eyes staring upwards, a prehistoric bird. Messages from the deep.

And this is surely the strangest twist in the Gulf coast saga: it seems to be waking us up to the reality that the Earth never was a machine. After 400 years of being declared dead, and in the middle of so much death, the Earth is coming alive.

The experience of following the oil’s progress through the ecosystem is a kind of crash course in deep ecology. Every day we learn more about how what seems to be a terrible problem in one isolated part of the world actually radiates out in ways most of us could never have imagined. One day we learn that the oil could reach Cuba – then Europe. Next we hear that fishermen all the way up the Atlantic in Prince Edward Island, Canada, are worried because the Bluefin tuna they catch off their shores are born thousands of miles away in those oil-stained Gulf waters. And we learn, too, that for birds, the Gulf coast wetlands are the equivalent of a busy airport hub – everyone seems to have a stopover: 110 species of migratory songbirds and 75% of all migratory US waterfowl.

It’s one thing to be told by an incomprehensible chaos theorist that a butterfly flapping its wings in Brazil can set off a tornado in Texas. It’s another to watch chaos theory unfold before your eyes. Carolyn Merchant puts the lesson like this: “The problem as BP has tragically and belatedly discovered is that nature as an active force cannot be so confined.”
Predictable outcomes are unusual within ecological systems, while “unpredictable, chaotic events [are] usual”. And just in case we still didn’t get it, a few days ago, a bolt of lightning struck a BP ship like an exclamation mark, forcing it to suspend its containment efforts. And don’t even mention what a hurricane would do to BP’s toxic soup.

There is, it must be stressed, something uniquely twisted about this particular path to enlightenment. They say that Americans learn where foreign countries are by bombing them. Now it seems we are all learning about nature’s circulatory systems by poisoning them.

In the late 90s, an isolated indigenous group in Colombia captured world headlines with an almost Avatar-esque conflict. From their remote home in the Andean cloud forests, the U’wa let it be known that if Occidental Petroleum carried out plans to drill for oil on their territory, they would commit mass ritual suicide by jumping off a cliff. Their elders explained that oil is part of ruiria, “the blood of Mother Earth”. They believe that all life, including their own, flows from ruiria, so pulling out the oil would bring on their destruction. (Oxy eventually withdrew from the region, saying there wasn’t as much oil as it had previously thought.)

Virtually all indigenous cultures have myths about gods and spirits living in the natural world – in rocks, mountains, glaciers, forests – as did European culture before the scientific revolution. Katja Neves, an anthropologist at Concordia University, points out that the practice serves a practical purpose. Calling the Earth “sacred” is another way of expressing humility in the face of forces we do not fully comprehend. When something is sacred, it demands that we proceed with caution. Even awe.

If we are absorbing this lesson at long last, the implications could be profound. Public support for increased offshore drilling is dropping precipitously, down 22% from the peak of the “Drill Now” frenzy. The issue is not dead, however. It is only a matter of time before the Obama administration announces that, thanks to ingenious new technology and tough new regulations, it is now perfectly safe to drill in the deep sea, even in the Arctic, where an under-ice clean up would be infinitely more complex than the one underway in the Gulf. But perhaps this time we won’t be so easily reassured, so quick to gamble with the few remaining protected havens.

Same goes for geoengineering. As climate change negotiations wear on, we should be ready to hear more from Dr Steven Koonin, Obama’s undersecretary of energy for science. He is one of the leading proponents of the idea that climate change can be combated with techno tricks like releasing sulphate and aluminium particles into the atmosphere – and of course it’s all perfectly safe, just like Disneyland! He also happens to be BP’s former chief scientist, the man who just 15 months ago was still overseeing the technology behind BP’s supposedly safe charge into deepwater drilling. Maybe this time we will opt not to let the good doctor experiment with the physics and chemistry of the Earth, and choose instead to reduce our consumption and shift to renewable energies that have the virtue that, when they fail, they fail small. As US comedian Bill Maher put it, “You know what happens when windmills collapse into the sea? A splash.”

The most positive possible outcome of this disaster would be not only an acceleration of renewable energy sources like wind, but a full embrace of the precautionary principle in science. The mirror opposite of Hayward’s “If you knew you could not fail” credo, the precautionary principle holds that “when an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health” we tread carefully, as if failure were possible, even likely. Perhaps we can even get Hayward a new desk plaque to contemplate as he signs compensation cheques. “You act like you know, but you don’t know.”

Naomi Klein visited the Gulf coast with a film-crew from Fault Lines, a documentary programme hosted by Avi Lewis on al-Jazeera English Television. She was a consultant on the film. Special thanks to Richard Charter

Times-Picayune Editorial: Coast Guard’s response to oil spill illustrates deeper problems in the agency

http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/07/post_18.html

Published: Monday, July 12, 2010, 6:31 AM

Metro New Orleans residents will always be grateful for the heroic performance of the U.S. Coast Guard after Hurricane Katrina. Even before tropical force winds subsided, its pilots began rescuing thousands of people, mostly New Orleanians stranded after the levee failures. That was the Coast Guard at its best, and its phenomenal service stood out amid a shameful federal response.

The agency has been tepid at times, and that has delayed cleanup efforts. The performance of some federal officials, including Coast Guard Adm. Thad Allen, has often left the public wondering whether the Coast Guard or BP is in charge. The Coast Guard’s emergency plans for a spill were inadequate, assuming as a worst-case scenario a finite spill like the 1989 Exxon Valdez in Alaska. The ongoing spill caught the agency flat-footed.

The agency’s problems handling the spill may also reflect a broader problem. After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the Coast Guard’s national security portfolio was expanded considerably. Aside from traditional duties, including search and rescue, aiding navigation and enforcing fisheries and environmental laws, the Coast Guard now provides security at more than 300 ports, patrols about 95,000 miles of coastline and supports military command overseas.

That has left the Coast Guard stretched thin. The agency, for example, was ordered in 2004 to crack down on barge operators that were overlooking safety rules. But the Coast Guard was slow in creating regulations and lacked resources to appropriately enforce them, leaving the industry to police itself.

Those deficiencies were exposed by the July 2008 collision between a barge and a ship that caused a 280,000-gallon oil spill in the Mississippi River at New Orleans, shutting down the waterway for days.

Further evidence of the Coast Guard’s strain came this week, when Adm. Robert Papp, the agency’s commandant, worried about the limited number of reservists available for the BP oil spill response. Many Coast Guard reservists have already been called to the Gulf or have been tied up in national security missions overseas.

Adm. Papp said he is forming a panel to draw lessons from the BP spill response. That’s good. But that discussion should also examine whether the Coast Guard should remain in charge of responding to this type of disaster in the future.

Special thanks to Richard Charter

Q’S AND A’S: NEW DEEPWATER DRILLING SUSPENSIONS

JULY 12, 2010

Q1. Why is Secretary Salazar issuing new deepwater drilling suspensions?

A1. Secretary Salazar has issued a new decision to suspend deepwater drilling activities based on an extensive record of existing and new information. The Secretary has concluded new suspensions are necessary because he has determined that new deepwater drilling would pose a threat of serious, irreparable, or immediate harm or damage to the marine, coastal, and human environment. The temporary pause on deepwater drilling will provide time for the implementation of safety reforms and for:

1. The submission of evidence by operators demonstrating that they have the ability to respond effectively to a potential oil spill in the Gulf, given the unprecedented commitment of available oil spill response resources that are now being dedicated to the BP oil spill;

2. The assessment of wild well intervention and blowout containment resources to determine the strategies and methods by which they can be made more readily available should another blowout occur; and

3. The collection and analysis of key evidence regarding the potential causes of the April 20, 2010 explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig, including information collected by the Presidential Commission and other investigations.

In addition, suspending these particular operations until November 30 will allow BOEM and the Department to develop the interim rules required to address the safety issues that have recently come to light. Some of these interim rules are expected to be issued within 120 days of the issuance of the May 27, 2010, Departmental report entitled “Increased Safety Measures for Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf” (the “Safety Report”), and additional time will be required after these rulemaking actions are completed for operators to implement the new requirements established by those rules. Other rules will have a longer development or implementation timeline, and Secretary Salazar will determine whether their implementation is essential before suspended operations may resume.

Q2. What are the differences between the May 28 deepwater drilling moratorium and the new deepwater drilling suspension?

A2. Like the deepwater drilling moratorium lifted by the District Court on June 22, the deepwater drilling suspensions ordered today apply to most deepwater drilling activities and could last through November 30. The suspensions ordered today, however, are the product of a new decision by the Secretary and new evidence regarding safety concerns, blowout containment shortcomings within the industry, and spill response capabilities that are strained by the BP oil spill. Moreover, the new decision by the Secretary establishes a process through which BOEM will gather and analyze new information from the public, experts, stakeholders, and the industry on safety and response issues, which could potentially provide the basis for identifying conditions for resuming certain deepwater drilling activities. In addition, the May 28 moratorium proscribed drilling based on specific water depths; the new decision does not suspend activities based on water depth, but on the basis of the drilling configurations and technologies.

Q3. What is the purpose of the meetings that Secretary Salazar is directing BOEM to hold?

A3. During the suspension, BOEM should continue to develop information about the relative risks posed by the various types of drilling activity, compliance with workplace and drilling safety requirements, status of blowout containment capabilities, and compliance with oil spill response requirements. Specifically, Secretary Salazar has directed Michael R. Bromwich, Director of BOEM, to conduct public meetings and outreach to gather additional information, on an expedited basis, on the primary issues that the Secretary identified as raising the most significant risks regarding the resumption of deepwater drilling:

1. Drilling and workplace safety requirements as outlined in the Safety Report and a timeline for the implementation of such safety requirements and others that may be necessary to ensure safe drilling practices;

2. Well intervention and blowout containment technology and methodology designed to effectively address and expeditiously contain any blowouts that could occur;

3. A review of additional and necessary oil spill response plans for offshore drilling and production facilities, and an evaluation of industry capacity to address a worst case discharge scenario under 30 CFR part 254.

This information gathering will be critical to addressing the serious risks presented by oil and gas drilling activities in deepwater environments. This additional information potentially could provide the basis for identifying conditions for resumption of drilling activities if certain conditions are met, and/or the identification of any oil and gas drilling activities that might be allowed prior to the expiration of the suspensions based on the relative level of risk associated with those activities.

Q4. The Secretary’s decision memo said that inspections of the BOPs on the new relief wells has identified unexpected performance problems with those BOPs. What were those performance problems and does that mean that the drilling of the relief wells is being conducted in an unsafe manner?

A4. The BOPs used in BP’s relief wells were subject to augmented testing procedures. These tests identified and allowed the repair of several problems, including:

During ROV hot stab testing, the Lower Marine Riser Package disconnect function was unsuccessful because of a leaking shuttle valve.
A failed shuttle valve caused an unsuccessful test of the All Stabs Retract function.
A failure of the deadman test because a shuttle valve was installed that should not have been.
A broken solenoid connection on the blue pod that prevented that pod from closing the casing shear rams.

Because these problems were identified by the new testing procedures, they were repaired, and the tests were successfully re-run. Interior is closely monitoring the drilling of the relief wells to ensure safety.

Q5. The Secretary’s decision allows certain low risk operations to occur in deepwater in spite of the suspensions. What are these activities and what’s the rationale for allowing them?

A5. Secretary Salazar has directed BOEM to direct the suspension of any authorized drilling of wells using subsea or surface BOPs on a floating facility. Secretary Salazar has further directed BOEM to cease the approval of pending and future applications for permits to drill wells using subsea or surface BOPs on a floating facility. These suspensions shall apply in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific regions through November 30, 2010, subject to modification if the Secretary determines that the significant threats to life, property, and the environment set forth in this memorandum have been sufficiently addressed.

These suspensions do not apply to production activities, drilling operations that are necessary to conduct emergency activities, such as the drilling operations related to the ongoing BP Oil Spill, nor do they apply to drilling operations necessary for completions or workovers (where surface BOP stacks are installed, they must be utilized during these operations), abandonment or intervention operations, waterflood, gas injection, or disposal wells. The exceptions to the drilling suspensions have been carefully considered based on their relative risk and their necessity to maintain ongoing production. Waterflood, injection and disposal wells are drilled into production reservoirs for which all the relevant geologic information is known to the operator. The drilling equipment and procedures, including the casing and cementing programs, are similar to those already used for the project. Such wells are typically considered routine and low risk. Completion and abandonment operations are conducted when the drilling of the well has been finished, and are necessary to, respectively, allow the well to produce or to secure and close the well. Workover operations are performed on wells drilled into a production reservoir with known geologic information and these operations are necessary to maintain production from these wells. All of these drilling operations must comply with NTL-N05.

Q6. How many drilling operations are affected by the suspensions ordered today?

A6. Any count of deepwater offshore drilling rigs in a particular region represents a snapshot in time. When the BP Oil Spill occurred, there were 36 floating drilling rigs that were either operating in the Gulf of Mexico, were between wells in the Gulf of Mexico, or were scheduled to come to the Gulf of Mexico to begin operations before the end of 2010. In addition, there were 19 platform rigs on floating production facilities in the Gulf of Mexico at that time. When the May 28 suspensions were put into effect, there were a total of 33 drilling rigs conducting operations in water depths of at least 500 feet – 26 floating rigs and 7 platform rigs. A total of 21 rigs of these rigs were required to reach a safe stopping point and to suspend drilling operations, and all have done so. The remaining 12 rigs have been conducting operations allowed under the moratorium.

Q8. What is the status of shallow water drilling permits?

A8. BOEM has been tracking drilling permit requests and well modification permit requests that are required to include the information outlined in NTL-N05 (Safety NTL) and/or NTL-N06 (Environmental NTL).

As of Monday, July 12, 9:00 a.m. EDT:

For those applications required to comply only with NTL-N05, 16 applications have been approved and 16 are pending.

For those applications required to comply with NTL -N05 and NTL-N06, 12 requests are pending.

This information is updated every business day, and can be found at: http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/offshore/safety/well_permits.html

In addition, since June 8, BOEM has approved 18 other shallow water permits, and 4 others are pending, to which there were no permit-specific requirements in either NTL. However, the applicants had to comply with NTL-N05’s general (company-wide) certification requirements before these applications could be processed.

The requirements of the NTLs affect the timing of the approvals.

One of the requirements of NTL-N05 was that the companies needed to submit certifications that they were complying with BOEM regulations and the joint BOEM-Coast Guard safety alert, and that they had conducted 4 specific reviews of their operations. These certifications were due on June 28. All but one operator has complied (the lone exception being in bankruptcy proceedings).

NTL-N06 requires companies to submit additional information on blowout and worst-case discharge scenarios, as well as measures to prevent a blowout, reduce the likelihood of a blowout and to conduct early and effective intervention in case of a blowout. This NTL was issued June 18. Currently, there are 33 submitted exploration or development plans to which NTL-N06 applies. Companies have submitted information for 11 of these plans, 5 of which have been returned for additional information and the other 6 of which are currently being reviewed.

Special thanks to Richard Charter

Linda Young, Clean Water Network of Florida: Weekly update on oil disaster July 9, 2010

Dear Friends of Florida waters:

It has been two weeks since I sent you an update on the oil disaster as perceived through my eyes, ears and nose. I have learned a lot in that time period and much has happened in terms of government action/inaction and of course to our waters and wildlife. It’s hard to know where to start, so I’ll just start and hope that it flows in a direction that makes sense to you.

First for some good news: There is definitely more information about what is happening to clean up the oil, now available on the internet. There are numerous links that you can follow, but the two that I find most helpful are these:

http://www.dep.state.fl.us/deepwaterhorizon/news.htm

http://map.floridadisaster.org/gator/

They both have further links inside of them, so if you are acutely interested in this situation, I would suggest that you spend time looking over these sites. The CERT-GATOR site is pretty amazing. As I have followed these sites over the past couple of weeks, one thing that really jumps out to me is the fact that there are so many boats and resources being committed to Destin and Panama City as compared to, for instance, Pensacola. But when you look at the oil recovered, the amount at Pensacola is enormously higher. Some oil has been getting over as far as Walton and Bay Counties, but relatively small amounts. Yet, the effort to protect these areas is remarkable. While I don’t know the reason for this seeming inequity, I would guess that its political, as in St. Joe Development Corporation put in a phone call to Tallahassee and said something like, “Don’t you dare let that oil get to the beaches where we own resorts and rental properties, etc.” For those of you who are not familiar with the incredible power of St. Joe, just take my word for it, when they demand something from the state or federal government . . . They get it. Other possible reasons could be that St. Andrews Bay is a very high quality estuary (or was before the state and federal government donated $400 million to build a new airport which has trashed a large part of the bay) and should be protected; there is a US Fish & Wildlife office and a National Marine Fisheries office there and so the federal government is more concerned; or the tax dollars that are generated by Panama City Beach are so high that the state doesn’t want to lose that income. Anyway, the important thing about this information is that your coastline may get more or less money, resources and protection, depending on who you know and how well politically connected you are.

Early last week, I sent some questions to the folks in Tallahassee who are intricately involved in the management of the state’s resources and decisions. Below is an excerpt from the email and the questions that I sent. My primary questions centered around threats to public health and information that has been circulating about the potential for the methane under the blown-out pipe to explode and possibly cause a tsunami along the Gulf Coast. I had requested the state’s position on this previously and was given a canned response from the DEP expert on the subject. What you will read here is my response to the state’s statement:

. . . . .There is an article on Huffington Post that explains the threat very succinctly and plainly and leads to more questions. One thing that the DEP expert said that didn’t sound right to me, was that the live video feed from the ocean floor around the busted well head does not show any leaking from the ocean floor.

“ I’ve watched the leaking wellhead and BP’s robots trying to plug it the last few weeks and it looks to me like all the leaking fluids go straight upward. If hydrates or an ultra high pressure bubble were forming, I would think it would be visible from one of the many robot cameras views we’ve seen on the live webcasts. We’ve seen the substrate near the leaking well. It’s muddy and turbulent, but all we’ve seen drifting by is what looks like white shell fragments and an occasional eel.”

He said that on June 17th and maybe it was after that, that we started seeing the video of oil and gas clearly bubbling up from the ocean floor around the wellhead. In any case, it clearly is happening. Senator Nelson made a big issue of it in his press conference two weeks ago. This may need to be revisited by DEP.

Also, in the transcript of the press conference given by Thad Allen on June 25th which was sent to me in the Deepwater Horizon memo, he completely dismisses any notion of a methane bubble. That in my opinion is irresponsible and worrisome. There is clearly a lot of methane down in that reserve and the government needs to be paying attention to it. We the taxpayers deserve an honest and full explanation of their findings.

I would ask that the Governor’s office immediately set up a panel of experts that have credibility with the public (so for instance if you had five experts, then no more than one would work for DEP) to review the pros and cons on this issue and to come out with a finding that will be public. If the scientists who are concerned are right and there were to be a catastrophic event(s) it seems that Florida would take the brunt of it. I don’t see how the state can not want to know all that it can possibly know about this and share it with the public. If you truly believe that we are not in danger, then you need to get that out to people.

DISPERSANTS – Would you please request from your contacts at BP or the Coast Guard, a complete list of dates, locations and amounts of dispersants that have been released? GPS coordinates would be fine for locations. I know this information must be available and the state has a right to know how close it is getting to Florida waters. If you would pass it on to me I would greatly appreciate it. Also, I would like to request that DEP contract with a reputable lab to do daily sampling of Florida waters for dispersants. If this is already being done then please advise me as to where I can review it. We need to have our state waters line sampled in several locations, as well as beaches and inland waters. Since DEP is apparently doing extensive data collection to document damages in the future, then it may be relatively easy for them to add dispersants to the list of samples that they take from inland and near shore waters. I repeat that it would be ideal to have our state water line that is 9.5 miles offshore, also sampled daily in several locations.

AIR QUALITY – As I understand what you have told me, so far the DEP has only sampled air quality for oil related pollutants in Apalachicola and Wakulla? Is this correct? I would like to request that air monitors be set up on Perdido Key, Pensacola Beach, Navarre Beach, and Okaloosa Island this week. As the storm blows the oil closer and we are likely to have winds from the south and southwest, it is critical that people have information about air quality to make informed decisions. You can’t advertise for people to come here and visit and then not make this important information available. Plus, permanent residents have a right to know if they are breathing toxic air on a regular basis. I would like the air tested either twice a day (early morning and just after dark) or constantly for such pollutants as: benzene, methane, hydrogen sulfide,and methylene chloride and any other suspected pollutants that could be expected. As I have said before, the air is often bad enough that you can’t be outside for any length of time. Surely the state wants to know if it’s residents are in danger and give us the option of making informed decisions about the risk we assume by staying in our homes for an extended period of time.

STORMS – The news stations tell us to expect more oil to get blown to shore by the TS Alex which is entering the lower Gulf of Mexico. That makes sense. Would you please make sure that larger booms are deployed to the greatest extent possible? The little sausage booms that are so popular in this disaster response are barely effective in calm seas and will be totally worthless in larger waves.

In closing, I want to thank you for all you efforts to effectively communicate what the Governor’s office and your agencies are doing to address this disaster. I’m hoping that all of your efforts will be successful. I continue to request that you secure more and better technology out in the Gulf to stop the oil from coming to shore. This would include boats and skimmers, booms and other devices that you find to be effective. I would also ask that when local governments request money for local protective measures, if you choose to deny their requests that you simultaneously provide some alternative protection that is demonstrated (or believed for good reason) to be equally or more protective. It is unhelpful for the state to deny our local governments the money to do the best that they can to protect their local resources and then not provide any sort of solution to the growing contamination that is occurring in our local waters. Our estuaries, marshes, streams, grassbeds, oysterbeds, etc MUST BE PROTECTED. I know that the state is concerned about scam-artists, bogus devices, etc. that will surely surface during this crisis situation, but it will be better to err on the side of making a few mistakes than to do nothing.

I look forward to hearing from you on the above questions and requests. I know it’s a lot to ask, but I will pass on your information to the members of my organization and all the people that they share my updates with, which is growing every day. Thank you again for all your efforts and assistance.”

That is the end of my letter. Here is what I have learned since then from the state and from EPA in Atlanta:

DISPERSANTS – The US EPA is only testing for dispersants in waters around Louisiana. There is apparently no testing for dispersants being done off the coast of Florida, on the theory that dispersants are not being sprayed in Florida waters, so therefore there is no need. Even though DEP is taking hundreds of water quality samples that will be used to build a case for damages from BP down the road, they are not testing for dispersants at all.

METHANE BUBBLE – See above. I also received a fact sheet from the state regarding methane related to offshore drilling. It was unhelpful. I was told that the state is looking into the question that I posed in the email above, but I have received no further helpful information regarding my concern about the methane gas issue.

Air Quality – Below is what I got from the state. After talking to many people in government, I don’t see any evidence that they want to know if the air is safe or not. Or the water for that matter.

Four VOC monitors have been established in Florida at: Naval Air Station Pensacola, Panama City Beach, Ft. Walton, and Eastpoint. Two of the monitors are run by EPA (with state assistance) and two are run entirely by the state. Both EPA and DEP monitors are sited according to EPA criteria established for this purpose.
The monitors are located where populations are more concentrated and better represent the air quality most local citizens are breathing; the locations are also adequate to assess ambient air quality at the coast. Direct placement of the monitors on or adjacent to the beach would not be considered the most ideal location. In this case, though, the Naval Air Station monitor is actually located just off the beach, so we have at least one location this is located adjacent to the beach. Also very important to note, the sites have to be in secured locations to protect the equipment. We believe that all four sites adequately balance all the considerations that need to be made in placing the monitors. [MY NOTE: the Naval Air Station is not located just off the beach].

We characterize the air monitoring effort for the oil spill as EPA’s effort. Florida is assisting EPA in this effort. To improve and augment coverage for Florida citizens, the state has added the two sites for VOC monitoring. In addition to the DEP monitoring results, we will soon be posting the EPA VOC monitoring results on the DEP air monitoring web page (http://www.dep.state.fl.us/deepwaterhorizon/air.htm).

EPA’s website:
www.epa.gov/bpspill/air.html

CLEAN UP TECHNOLOGY: Numerous people have sent me questions about who to contact to share clean-up technology. Here’s what I got from the state:

Below are links to be used by citizens who wish to submit for evaluation, or bring to the attention of decision-makers, technologies for use in connection with the oil contamination.

Innovative.Technology@dep.state.fl.us

Innovative Technology Evaluation Sheet

http://www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com/go/doc/2931/546759/

http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/techsolution.html

I hope this information will be helpful to you. As always, there is so much to tell, and I know it can be overwhelming. Many of you have written me with specific questions and that’s great. I’ll try to answer each one as they come in. Have a great weekend and I will do the same. You’ll hear from me again next week.

For all of Florida’s waters,

Linda Young
Director

"Be the change you want to see in the world." Mahatma Gandhi